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European bank loan loss provisioning and technological 
innovative progress 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This paper presents an analysis of Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP) behavior of European banks 
across 26-member states to determine how bad management and Technological Innovative 
Progress (TIP) has affected bank risk management.  Technological improvements in banking 
have seen advances in both back and front office operations with respect to lending.  This is 
created through increased disembodied technological change capturing improvements in both 
non-financial and risk management technologies.  We find, using a new dynamic LLP model 
that European banks employed bad management practices in relation to their lending and 
monitoring practices, leading to higher losses on loans (through increased LLPs).  However, 
the relationship between TIP and LLPs indicates that those banks which increased their 
technological efficiency with respect to costs had a greater ability to recognize bad loans, and 
were therefore able to subsequently increase LLPs.  That is, improving technology mitigated 
the impact of bad management practices in European banks. 
 
Keywords: Loan loss provision accounting; Bad management; Technological innovative 
progress; Earnings management; Risk management.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims to present the first contribution introducing and testing whether 
technological innovative progress (TIP) and the effects of increases in scale effects associated 
with TIP (TIPSB) has had an effect on Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP) risk strategies.  As Berger 
(2003) discusses, technological innovation can come about through internet banking, electronic 
payments systems and information exchanges (e.g., the increase in the number of ATMs – in 
the UK ATMS have increased year-on-year from 54,900 in 2004 to 69,600 in 2017).  
Furthermore, increases in TIP can have a positive effect on productivity and scale efficiencies 
as banks are able to reduce financing costs and risk through the increased use of derivatives 
and off-balance sheet activities such as securitization, something found recently by Badunenko 
& Kumbhakar (2017).  However, to the best of our knowledge, TIP and TIPSB have not, as 
yet, become a common determinant in the estimation of dynamic models within the LLP 
literature.  The implication of this is that to date, it has not been tested whether TIP or TIPSB 
affects the LLP risk behavior of bank management – which we find in this research. 
This can be considered an important omission within the current literature concerning the 
potential relationship between TIP, TIPSB and LLP and needs to be considered.  Indeed, as 
banks have advanced their internal processes associated with IT systems, and better managed 
their loan portfolios through increased risk management modelling, this gives rise to 
endogeneity in any empirical specification1.  TIP and TIPSB is therefore an important 
determinant of the risk management of LLPs in banks and can follow an erratic process over 
the economic cycle as inputs change due to inventive and innovative progress.  In addition, 
technological advances can also come from external factors including changes in regulation 
(see Allen & Liu 2007), which are then implemented by banks internally, or through 
deregulation and increases in competition (see Liu, 2010 and Badunenko & Kumbhakar 2017).  
For example, the Basel accords which were implemented in our sample period resulted in 
updates to capital requirements and changed the internal risk management characteristics of 
banks with respect to LLPs (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004).  This seemingly 
exogenous effect can be internally compartmentalized into banks LLP risk management 
business models again leading to endogeneity between TIP and LLP (see, Adrian, 2018).   
Furthermore, TIP can be said to be embodied or disembodied and as such, technological 
change becomes an important characteristic of bank risk management behavior dynamically.  
                                                 
1 An excellent review of changes in risk management processes and regulations in banks and their effect on bank 
operations can be found in a recent IMF paper, Adrian (2018). 
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We posit that technological innovations in LLP risk management can be embodied in the design 
of information technology (IT), new regulations, and risk management processes, that are used 
in both back-end and front-end applications. Which we consider has had an effect on how loan 
portfolios are monitored, and subsequently the risk assessments utilized when agreeing to 
loans.  As Fukuyama and Weber (2015) argue “financial institutions should be willing to 
accept nonperforming loans up to the point where the lost income (including principle) on the 
marginal performing loan is just offset by the reduced monitoring costs or by the increased 
interest income on the loan portfolio” (page 46).  However, embodied technological change 
with respect to LLPs is difficult to establish unless the researcher has inside information on the 
system characteristics of banks’ IT risk arrangements and thereby their IT cost procurements 
for risk systems over time (as discussed by Berger, 2003).   
To circumvent non-reporting of individual bank spending on technological improvements 
we proxy TIP by the use of estimating technological change through a cost function (this first 
stage has been undertaken by Hunter & Timme, 1991, Drake & Simper, 2002 and Berger, 
2003).  Hence, we consider technologies such as information processing (i.e., improved quality 
in processing deposit and loan customer information), and financial technologies such as, more 
advance use of risk management statistical techniques (i.e., more efficient future risk evaluation 
of the loan portfolio) – thus estimating directly disembodied technological change.  This so 
called disembodied technological change therefore provides us with an initial insight to 
determine whether there are dynamic characteristics that should be considered when analyzing 
bank LLP risk management behavior (with which we concur). 
Finally, our additional contribution is to estimate a comprehensive model that examines the 
major LLP hypotheses whilst incorporating bad management, TIP and TIPSB in a dynamic 
second stage specification.  However, we have to accept that these additional descriptors with 
LLP, could be endogenous, thereby leading to problems of estimation in a standard setting.  To 
overcome these problems we follow the approach of system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995 
and Blundell & Bond, 1998) and we conduct a thorough SGMM with additional post estimation 
diagnostics not commonly reported in previous LLP empirical literature.  Unfortunately, the 
former problem of finding correct instruments and ensuring that a dynamic LLP model is not 
over instrumentalized has been misinterpreted in the literature, leading to potentially biased 
and misleading results, which we aim to address.  It should be noted at this point the importance 
of the Hansen J-statistic and how researchers have misinterpreted the estimate and Roodman’s 
p-value equal to a 0.25 lower bound (Roodman, 2009b).  Indeed, Roodman (2009a) warns 
against the ‘liberal’ use of conventional significance levels when trying to rule out correlation 
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between instruments and the error term.  For example, Mamatzakis et al. (2013), Table 11, has 
all 6 models with a Hansen statistic below 0.163, Table 12 with all 4 models below 0.22 and 
Table 13 with all 5 models having a Hansen below 0.24; Skala’s (2015) Models (7) and (8) 
present p-values equal to 0.17 and 0.03; whereas, Olszak et al. (2016) Table 3 gives actual 
values (“*** denotes significant at the 1% level”) equal to 1343.45*** (Model 3), 1310.45*** 
(Model 4) and 284.4*** (Model 8), Table 4, Models 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 10 all have ‘significant at 
the 1% level’, in Table 5, all 13 different models have ‘significant at the 1% level’ and even in 
their ‘robustness check, Table 9 has 9 of the 12 models all rejecting at the 1% critical level 
Hansen statistics.  Our final contribution is to present a coherent LLP dynamic specification 
that can therefore explain these numerous theories in a fully specified model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of previous 
literature specific to LLP.  Section 3 presents our hypotheses.  Section 4 provides a detailed 
justification of our methodological approach with Section 5 discussing the data. Section 6 
presents our empirical results and discusses them in the context of both previous studies, with 
conclusions developed in Section 7. 
 
 
2.  Literature survey of traditional LLP behavior 
In an economic downturn the nature of LLPs is an important determinant to be analyzed by 
regulators.  That is, if capital fails to cover the growth of bad loans in a recession there could 
be a potential feedback into the real economy as banks reduce lending to cover these losses by 
increasing LLPs.  This could ultimately exacerbate a downturn in the business cycle through 
reduced lending as found in European banks (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008).  Furthermore, Glen 
& Mondragón-Vélez (2011) argue, ‘understanding these dynamics’ is of importance for 
investors and regulators to determine what effect macroeconomic downturns could have on 
bank loan portfolios (see also Anandarajan, Hasan, & Lozano-Vivas, 2005) and hence 
inefficiencies.  Indeed, the bad management hypothesis argues that these inefficiencies could be 
created through poor credit monitoring (use of technology), insufficient control of operating costs, 
and unstable capital.  Given that identified credit losses are absorbed by the specific component of 
LLPs, managers could have an incentive to increase general LLPs thereby reducing future 
unidentified risks and their effect on Tier 2 capital.  Bad management therefore indicates a negative 
relationship between efficiency and LLPs and is tested directly in our new model.   
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Efficiency could also influence future income streams through cost skimping which implies 
banks cut costs such as loan monitoring and screening for higher short-term profit efficiency.  Thus, 
when banks boost profit efficiency, loan losses could increase in the future, despite an unchanged 
current level of documented nonperforming loans (NPLs).  Therefore, low efficiency could 
encourage managers to add more general LLPs for future safety whilst not increasing specific 
LLPs.  Cost skimping suggests a likely positive relationship between efficiency and general LLP, 
but also a lagged  relationship with NPL because “as time passes,…, the inaction to the loan 
portfolio becomes apparent” (Berger & DeYoung, 1997, page 853).  Hence, this leads us to posit a 
dynamic model as previous levels of LLP, through the discretionary component of bank 
management, has a feedback mechanism to current LLP levels. 
The final associated LLP hypothesis states that low efficiency could increase future risk because 
of moral hazard.  In the presence of information asymmetry and agency problems, managers take 
on more risk which is entirely borne by shareholders and hence engage in risky non-traditional 
banking services, such subprime lending, to boost profitability (Hughes & Mester, 1998 and 
Fiordelisi et al. 2011). Moral hazard could therefore be prevalent when banks in the recent 
regulatory environment, considered themselves to be systemically important and hence ‘too big to 
fail’ (TBTF)2.   
Finally, it is also of interest to regulators as to why banks counter or pro-cyclically LLP 
manage risk, where one such hypothesis relates to how LLPs can be used to manipulate 
earnings by income smoothing and ultimately a bank’s share price.  With respect to economists, 
they generally regard income smoothing more positively due to reducing the negative impacts 
of asset volatility across the business cycle, for example, on bank capital (see Anandarajan et 
al., 2005).  Interestingly, contrariwise to economists, accountants regard income smoothing as 
financial manipulation (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003) whereby managers are able to use their own 
judgement to influence earnings (through the discretionary component of LLP; Bouvatier & 
Lepetit, 2008) and hence create problems for shareholders comparing firm profitability and 
subsequent optimal portfolio share allocations.  That is, income smoothing “introduces 
judgemental modifications to a firm’s earnings, that also when not induced by personal 
managers’ objectives, tend to reduce the comparability of results across firms, and may 
ultimately damage shareholder value” Laeven & Majnoni (2003), page 197.  This, of course, 
is based on the seminal findings of Litner (1956) in that corporations appear to smooth 
                                                 
2  The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) was the largest bank globally by total assets in 2008, yet required over £45 
billion in emergency government funding in October of that year in an attempt to remain liquid and maintain 
stability in the UK banking market.  It is widely recognised that the majority of the funds issued by the government 
were used to cover credit write-downs in the ill-fated recently acquired ABN-Amro subsidiary of the business.   
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dividends relative to earnings.  Indeed, reporting stability concerning income streams can 
signal cost efficiencies and could affect stock price stability and external rating performance, 
as well as lowering funding costs and increasing management bonuses and salaries (Bikker & 
Metzemakers, 2005).  Income smoothing can also distort efficient markets as complete 
information on the earnings of banks are not fully known or understood by all market 
participants; leading to arbitrage opportunities for those who know the income-smoothing 
practices of a particular bank (see, Fonseca and González, 2008 and Leventis et al. 2011).  We 
next present our hypotheses in relation to efficiencies and technological innovative progress.  
 
3. LLP hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis 1. Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) 
Our first measure estimates the percentage change in cost of inputs resulting from changes 
in bank technology.  Our so-called TIP measures are obtained from a Stochastic Frontier cost 
function (details are provided in Supplementary Appendix A)3.  Following Badunenko & 
Kumbhakar (2017) we estimate TIP holding everything else constant in the cost function equal 
to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇⁄ ) where “technical change in a cost function is cost diminution over time” 
(page 796).  If 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0, then bank outputs can be produced at a lower total cost as a result of 
TIP.  Given data and the parameter estimates obtained from the cost function, TIP is 
incorporated into our specification as an individual bank specific variable, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  In addition, 
TIP can be further decomposed into a scale biased technological innovative progress along the 
ray average cost curve 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇⁄ ).  If 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 < 0, then for a given product 
mix, TIP causes larger banks to be more efficient over time than their smaller competitors and 
hence helps to minimize costs (see, Berger, 2003 and Allen & Liu, 2007).  That is, after the 
technological change, production at the previously optimal size (𝑄𝑄) is no longer cost 
minimizing, and bank size has to increase to 𝑄𝑄∗ (where 𝑄𝑄∗ > 𝑄𝑄) in order to minimize ray 
average costs.  In terms of our model, this again is incorporated through individual bank 
specific estimates, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  Given that negative values of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) imply technological 
progress, in order to make the regression equation more intuitive, we decompose the two 
proxies into two separate dummy variables capturing negative and positive values separately.  
                                                 
3 We use the standard Intermediation approach commonly estimated in the literature, see for example, Williams 
(2004), Allen & Liu (2016) Girardone et al. (2009), Wheelock and Wilson (2012) and Bryce et al. (2015).  It is 
not an aim of this paper to delve into a discussion of the input/output debate on bank modelling. 
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More specifically, the negative dummy variable takes the value of 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) for banks 
with negative 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 values (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) and zero otherwise.  Similarly, we introduce a second 
dummy that takes the value of  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) for banks with positive 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 values (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
and zero otherwise4.  These dummies are reported as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 
respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bad Management 
We include return on average equity (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟), where performance is used as a proxy for the 
quality of management.  This expands on the NPL models of Louzis et al. (2012) where the 
authors consider a ‘bad management II’ hypothesis using return on equity as a proxy for 
managerial abilities.  In LLP modelling ROE is an uncommon variable but it can show that if 
banks increase loans (holding inputs constant, e.g., monitoring) then they could see an increase 
in profitability (efficiency) in the short run.  However, in the long run they may experience 
worse bank performance results, ROE therefore serves as a proxy for poor lending abilities 
which in turn implies increased levels of LLPs.  As Louzis et al. (2012) states “performance is 
negatively associated with increases in future NPLs,…, by regarding past performance as a 
proxy for the quality of management” or in our case LLPs (page. 1015).  To include bad 
management in our model is an addition to the LLP literature which so far excludes this relevant 
variable (see, for example, Anandarajan, Hasan & Lozano-Vivas 2005; Fonseca and González, 
2008; and Leventis et al. 2011).   
 
Hypothesis 3: Income Smoothing 
Bank management may adjust LLPs in order to report stability of income streams over time 
by increasing (decreasing) the level of LLP when net profits are high (low) in order to minimize 
variance in earnings.  To capture any income smoothing and mitigate for potential endogeneity, 
we include profit before taxes and provisions scaled by lagged total assets (𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) (Skala, 
2015).  This implies that LLPs could increase during periods of economic growth while they 
decline throughout economic downturns (Bouvatier & Lepetit, 2008).  As stated above and to 
recap, this practice could affect market efficiency through increases in asymmetric information 
between principle and agent.  On the other hand, income-smoothing assumes a positive 
                                                 
4 Similar dummy variable has been used by Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) to capture non-linearity in the relation 
between LLP and earnings.     
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connotation for economists since it can be considered as a tool to reduce asset volatility on 
bank capital across the business cycle (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Capital Management 
The capital management hypothesis is tested by the inclusion of total common equity over 
average assets (𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕), in which banks manipulate (general) LLPs in order to maintain a 
particular capital adequacy ratio under Basel I (Basel Committee, 1987), where general LLP 
are included in Tier 2, albeit subject to strict limits (see, Agarwal et al. 2007). That is, since 
there is a potentially high cost associated with raising new capital on the market, especially 
during economic downturns, there is an incentive for banks to manage their capital ratios using 
general LLP under Basel I (but less so under Basel II). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Business Cycle 
The business cycle hypotheses are tested in consideration of the significance of 
macroeconomic {𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟} coefficients which includes GDP growth (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) and 
unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇).  If we find a positive GDP growth and negative unemployment 
rate coefficients, this indicates pro-cyclical managing of LLPs.  These are the standard 
variables utilized in the literature, see for example, Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Bouvatier 
& Lepetit (2008) and Bushman & Williams (2012), Ghosh (2007) and Leventis et al. (2011).  
 
Additional Control Variables and Hypotheses of Interest.  
As is also common in the LLP modelling literature, we include both bank and industry 
specific control factors which could affect management behavior towards the manipulation of 
LLPs.  The bank specific controls include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the bank 
is listed to the stock exchange (𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙) and a size proxy (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈) expressed as the log of total 
assets (Pérez et al. 2008).  To capture variation in LLP with respect to loan expansions and 
increased credit risk while controlling for the non-discretionary component of LLP we include 
a control variable change in the rate of growth of loans (𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟).  Forward looking provision 
implies that banks anticipate that loan growth may results in future NPLs and therefore counter 
cyclically provision against potential loan losses.  A negative relationship between loan growth 
and LLP points towards lack of prudential provisioning strategies under rapid loan expansion, 
similar to Bikker & Metzemakers (2005), Fonseca & González (2008) and Skala (2015).  We 
also include Loans to Deposits (𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜) as a proxy for liquidity and loan coverage by banks.  
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In relation to the {𝑇𝑇𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙}, we include the industry overall non-
performing loans (𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼) and following Fujii et al. (2018) we add a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if the country belongs to the EU15 group of countries, and zero otherwise (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈15).  
Finally, we include a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008-2011 and zero 
otherwise to capture variations in LLP due to the global financial crisis (𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙)5. 
 
 
4. Research design 
As a basis for our LLP specification, we posit a relationship such that LLP becomes a 
function of previous years’ LLPs, and its value at time t is likely to be affected by its lagged 
term.  This general specification is given by equation (1).   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Where, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 is the ratio of loan loss provisions to average loans (as in Anandarajan, Hasan & 
McCarthy 2007), 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 is the autoregressive component capturing dynamics in the 
provisioning practices, 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector of explanatory variables capturing income smoothing, 
capital management, business cycle, bad management, TIP, and bank specific characteristics; 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 are individual bank specific effects; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term and where the subscripts 𝑜𝑜 =1, . . ,𝑈𝑈 and 𝑜𝑜 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 denote the cross sectional and time dimensions of the panel.  However, 
given the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the equation to be estimated, the 
conventional panel data estimators are inconsistent since the unobserved panel-level effects are 
correlated with the lags of the dependent variable.  First differencing (∆) equation (1) 
eliminates the individual effects and estimation becomes a straightforward instrumental 
variables problem, which allows the existence of potentially endogenous right-hand side 
variables6.  This general specification is given by equation (2).  
∆LLP𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
                                                 
5 In preliminary analysis we included time fixed effects but were found to be jointly insignificant and consequently 
we do not include them in the main model.  The results were found to be qualitatively the same.  The definition 
for the outset of the global financial crisis follows Curcio et al., (2017).  We also included a crisis dummy to 
capture the years 2008-2014 (and 2009-2014).  The results overall remain consistent.  
6 This is the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator where instruments can be constructed in the form of lagged 
differences or lagged levels. 
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Arellano & Bond (1991) propose the use of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
procedure taking advantage of all available moment conditions, from which instrumental 
variables can be drawn from.  More specifically, the set of instrumental variables used in the 
estimation of equation (2) is derived from the following moment conditions, equation (3). 
𝑈𝑈(𝜲𝜲𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑈𝑈(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 0 … 𝑙𝑙 > 𝑗𝑗 (3) 
The above equation suggests that lagged levels of the lagged dependent, and explanatory 
variables, are used as instruments for the differenced equation.  Arellano & Bover (1995) and 
Blundell & Bond (1998) suggest that variables in levels may be poor instruments for the 
differenced equation when they are close to a random walk.  To mitigate this potential 
shortcoming, they build a system of equations, consisting of the equation in differences and in 
levels in a stacked form, equation (4). 
�
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝑟𝑟 + �𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗=1
�
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗
𝛥𝛥𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗
� + 𝛽𝛽 � 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛥𝛥𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
The above equation can be estimated as a system and Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell 
& Bond (1998) suggest using lagged levels as well as lagged differences as instruments; 
covering any potential weakness arising from the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimation 
technique.  Formally, these additional orthogonality conditions can be expressed as, equation 
(5).   
𝑈𝑈[�Δ𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�] = 𝑈𝑈[�Δ𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑠𝑠(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�] = 0 … 𝑙𝑙 > 𝑗𝑗 (5) 
The orthogonality restrictions described in equations (3) and (5) provide the underpinnings of 
the panel data system GMM (SGMM) estimation.  Under the assumption of independent and 
homoscedastic residuals, consistent parameter estimates can be obtained, while controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity bias and the aforementioned dynamic 
relationships.  
The majority of empirical studies that have adopted the LLP GMM method also consider 
the dynamics of bank management in a combined hypothesis testing model; see, for example, 
Laeven & Majnoni (2003), Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008), Fonseca & González (2008), Bryce et 
al. (2015) and Olszak et al. (2016).  Indeed, our model incorporates jointly, bad management, 
TIP, income smoothing, capital management and business cycle hypotheses, proposing a new 
model.  This is now the preferred approach and circumvents potential problems on the 
exclusion of relevant variables in hypothesis testing; see (Anandarajan, Hasan, & McCarthy, 
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2007 and Ghosh 2007).  Rewriting equation (1) the specific econometric regression takes the 
following form, equation (6), 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜 + 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑗𝑗 +𝛽𝛽1𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+  𝛽𝛽4𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6,7�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)<0;𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  + 𝛽𝛽8,9�𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇)>0;𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  + 𝛾𝛾1,2{𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}+  𝛿𝛿1,2{𝑇𝑇𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝐵𝐵 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}+ 𝛿𝛿3,4{𝑇𝑇𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖} + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
(6) 
In equation (6), the subscripts 𝑜𝑜 and 𝑜𝑜 denote the bank and time dimension of the panel data 
(we further omit these notations for simplicity).  In relation to the variables included in the 
model, lagged values of the dependent variable capture the autoregressive component in the 
emergence of doubtful loans, or time series persistency (see Packer & Zhu, 2012).  These lags 
give therefore a closer approximation to the potential impact of stock variables on LLP at time 
t and lessens the potential problems related to omitted variables (Laeven & Majnoni, 2003).  
The introduction of lags of the dependent variable also takes into account a change in the speed 
of adjustment of loan loss provisions and “captures adjustment costs that constrain complete 
adjustment to an equilibrium level” (Fonseca & González, 2008, page 221).  The remaining 
explanatory variables follow the discussion on Section 3 with their associated hypotheses.  
 
 
5. The data 
Bank-level data was downloaded from BankScope (Fitch-IBCA) over the period 2002 to 
2014, hence beginning at the introduction of Euro note circulation (€), with 
industry/macroeconomic variables obtained from World Bank and SNL Financial.  A similar 
sample period has also been used in Fujii et al. (2018), but the sample of banks has been 
decreased due to missing data in the dependent variable LLP.  Finally, McKee & Kagan, (2018) 
also utilize a data set ending in 2014 in a study of US community banks.  The sample is 
constructed based on the following rationale; firstly, we are interested in how banks based in 
member states behave in local markets with respect to LLPs and are therefore not individually 
influenced by cross-border management behavior from non-domestic bank holding companies 
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located in another jurisdiction - which of course could be found under a consolidated sample7.  
We therefore follow the methodology of the ‘SYMBOL’ bank stress testing risk assessments 
published by the European Commission that models risk associated with non-performing loans 
using only unconsolidated data (Benczur et al., 2017 also follows this procedure).  The final 
sample consists of 450 commercial banks with 3.145 observations, operating in 26 European 
countries.  Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our dynamic SGMM 
for the full sample.  (a detailed discussion on the frequency distributions of banks per country 
and year and a description of asset size classes can be found in Supplementary Appendix B). 
   
 
INSERT TABLES 1 & 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables used in the regression.  
None of the bank specific variables exhibit very high correlations therefore mitigating any 
multicollinearity concerns.  With respect to the macroeconomic and industry variables, we 
observe that the reported correlations follow the theoretical expectations and the highest 
correlation is reported between the unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇) and industry non-performing 
loans (𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼), 0.576 (significant at the 5% level).  In terms of insignificance – only 15 pairwise 
correlations were found to show an insignificant relationship between the variables.  We next 
present our results. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1. Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) Results 
Table 3, Panel A reports the results of TIP for each of the 5 quintiles (asset classes) in which 
frequency indicates the number of banks within each quintile that are negative and significantly 
                                                 
7 For example, the European Central Bank supervised entity list shows banks which are supervised on the grounds 
of different ‘significant asset size’ starting from a bottom class of €30 to €50 billion.  For example, in terms of the 
Spanish bank Banco Santander S.A. (size class above €1,000 billion) it has individual ‘significant size presence’ 
in Spain, Portugal, Austria, Belgium Germany, Italy and Luxemburg.  Whereas, the French bank BNP Paribus 
(size class above €1,000 billion) has individual ‘significant size presence’ in France, Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Luxemburg, The Netherlands and Portugal.  Hence, the use of consolidated accounts could muddy the water 
concerning which country management risk practice is used overall, say in the home country (Spain or France) 
against its overseas banks in constituent countries within the European Union.  An unconsolidated approach is 
therefore deemed best to determine the characteristics at the individual country level instead of a Bank Holding 
Company approach (consolidated) which could not differentiate across and between these interesting country 
specific management LLP difference practices – again based on the EU SYMBOL approach to analysing banks. 
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different from zero.  With respect to the results we observe that 38.51% of banks experienced 
overall TIP.  In addition, the different subgroups indicate that quintiles 2, 3 and 4 (the small, 
medium and large banks respectively) experienced greater cost reductions due to TIP than the 
average sized banks.  For example, with respect to quintile 2 (small banks with assets between 
€280 million and €669 million) had a TIP equal to 51.51% and quantile 3 (medium asset sized 
banks €670 million to €1,291 million) had the largest TIP equal to 65.82%.   
These results show that the small and medium banks appear to be statistically more 
innovative due to technological change than the largest banks (quintile 5 equal to 11.61%).  An 
explanation for these results is that small and medium sized banks innovate at a faster rate than 
the largest banks (quintile 5) as the latter can rely on a large customer based and branch network 
– exploiting market power for profitability.  Whereas, smaller banks rely on being agile in the 
face of innovation to counteract scale inefficiencies (being too small in asset size) to fund 
operations, reduce capital costs, and implement new technologies to reduce costs.   
Interestingly our finding is an update to Berger & Deyoung (2003), who in their analysis 
between the relationship of the largest MBHCs to smaller affiliates, find that “MBHCs apply 
some of the hard-information techniques to small bank affiliates for the first time, yielding 
substantial increases in control over these affiliates” (p. 1507) and as such the smallest banks 
had greater TIP.  As we only consider unconsolidated banks our results indicate a standalone 
size effect of small and medium size asset banks and not a relationship where the largest banks 
force cost efficiencies on smaller banks through their own innovations.  Our results could also 
show that the smaller banks are playing TIP catch-up with their larger competitors. 
With respect to the scale biased results our findings show that overall TIPSB also increased, 
equal to 44.07%, but this effect is largest in relation to quintiles 1, 2 and 3 and as such these 
banks were able to increase their efficient size due to TIP (Table 3, Panel B) and hence again 
reduce costs.  The smaller and medium size banks were able to expand operations (outputs) 
faster than the largest banks due to the introduction of new technology (additional discussion 
on the distributions of TIP(SB) for different asset sizes can be found in Supplementary 
Appendix C). 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
Figure 1 (Panels A and B) shows the distributions of TIP and TIPSB in the pre and post-
crisis periods (we follow Curcio & Hasan (2015) and define 2008 as the beginning of the crisis).  
The vertical lines represent the median of the distribution and values less than zero indicate 
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technological progress.  In all panels the thin solid line represents no technological progress.  
With respect to TIP we observe that banks relied on innovations to reduce their costs more 
during than after the crisis period (2008-2014).  Indeed, we observe a shift in the density 
distribution towards the left in the post-crisis period.  These results compare nicely with 
Badunenko & Kumbhakar (2017) who found positive technological progress for state banks 
equal to 2%, and foreign banks equal to 8% which then declined to 0% after re-regulations in 
India.  The difference between the results is that we consider GFC whereas Badunenko & 
Kumbhakar (2017) review changes in Indian bank regulations.  Furthermore, with respect to 
TIPSB, we note that banks experience size increases due to innovations both in the pre and the 
post-crisis periods.  However, this effect is stronger in the pre-crisis period (represented by the 
thin-dotted line on the left of the graph) as the post-crisis distribution shifts to the right after 
2008 (represented by the long-dash distribution). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 
The above observations are further examined by presenting only the distributions of the 
banks that experienced a significant TIP result (Figure 2). Panel A shows this distribution with 
respect to those banks that exhibit reductions in cost due to technological progress.  The post-
crisis distribution has a longer left tail than the pre-crisis, indicating greater TIP for the years 
after the crisis.   
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
We find that banks increased technological innovations after the crisis by implementing new 
loan controls, whilst adjusting risk management process through innovations and regulation 
(for a discussion of changes in risk regulations during our sample period and how banks 
changed their operations see a recent IMF report, Adrian, 2018).  Whereas, Panel B shows the 
results for the TIPSB and as noted above, the scale effects due to technological innovations 
fade away in the post-crisis period as the distribution (solid line, Panel B) has shorter left tail, 
with a higher negative median.   
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6.2. Results from dynamic LLP Model. 
We estimate a first order dynamic panel data model, following the Arellano & Bond (1991), 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998) method of a two-step system GMM 
estimator (SGMM)8.  In our model we assume that all macroeconomic/industry control 
variables are strictly exogenous to individual banks.  On the other hand, with respect to the 
bank specific variables, prior literature does not offer conclusive evidence as to whether or not 
LLP determinants should be treated as endogenous or exogenous (Skala, 2015).  From an 
economic perspective, endogeneity may arise due to simultaneous determination of LLP and 
any of the explanatory bank specific variables.  For example, LLP and innovations could be 
simultaneously determined and the direction of correlation could run from LLP to 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇).  That is, if we assume technological innovations are endogenous choice variables for 
banks and their levels are chosen so as to optimize the reported levels of LLP at 𝑜𝑜, then the 
reported LLP levels may in turn effect the future level of innovations that banks are willing to 
attain9.  The implication will be a causal effect from the dependent variable to bank 
innovations.  In this case, LLP and technological innovations are simultaneously determined 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 should be treated as endogenous regressors and appropriate IVs be 
constructed and used in estimation.  We reject the null hypothesis of a strict exogeneity test 
(Wooldridge, 2001), confirming that bank innovations are dynamically endogenous to LLP10.  
In determining consistency across the SGMM estimator and following prior literature 
(Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003), two post estimation tests are conducted; the Hansen test 
of joint validity of the instruments and the second order serial correlation (Arellano – Bond), 
in order to evaluate the correct specifications of the models.  The Hansen over identification 
test confirmed the validity of our instruments and the absence of correlation between the 
instruments used and the error term in the models (we fail to reject the null hypotheses in all 
of the model specifications).  It should be noted there is no clear rule as to the optimal number 
of instruments that should be included in a GMM estimator.  However, the proposal by 
Roodman (2009a) concerning the number of instruments and the Hansen J-test p-values are 
                                                 
8 To ensure dynamic completeness, we estimate four (4) auxiliary regressions with different subsets of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 lags.  
We chose the preferred lag specification on the basis of Akaike's/Schwarz's Bayesian information criteria and a 
Vuong (1989) test.  Results are available upon request. 
9 This process is subject to income smoothing, capital management and pro/counter cyclical provisioning 
purposes, among others – as implied by equation (6). 
10 Further lag analysis where we regress the current levels and changes of these levels of the bank specific 
variables on LLP lags, suggests that previous year’s LLP levels are negatively (positively) related to levels of 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0), confirming the findings of the strict exogeneity test.  Results of the strict exogeneity and lag 
analysis tests are available upon request. 
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followed.  For example, in Model 1, the number of instruments (442) does not exceed the 
number of groups (450).  Second, the p-values obtained from the Hansen J-statistic equal 0.516.  
In addition, we investigate the relevance of the SGMM instruments based on under-
identification tests, following Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2012) (these tests are discussed in more 
detail in Supplementary Appendix C).  Furthermore, we confirm the validity of the SGMM by 
rejecting the null of no first order serial correlation 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(1) and we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of no second order serial correlation 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(2); which indicates a correct model 
specification.  Finally, the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) is 
implemented, calculating corrected standard errors. 
 
6.2.1. Discussion of results 
With respect to the empirical findings, we present results from different estimators that 
operate under different assumptions.  More specifically, we report findings from static 
OLS/fixed-effects regressions, dynamic OLS and SGMM11.  The estimated coefficients from 
the regressions are presented in Table 4.  The results suggest that the LLP ratio is a positive 
function of its own lag, with significant coefficients equal to 0.28 to 0.58 (columns [1] and [2]).  
One insight from the dynamic OLS is the importance of past levels of LLP in explaining 
variations in its current levels (the 𝐺𝐺2 increases from 0.18 in the static OLS to 0.62 in the 
dynamic).  This finding suggests that banks are likely to increase their loan provisions if they 
have already made provisions in the previous year. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
Hypothesis 1: Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) 
With respect to TIP, one insight that becomes clear is that in the absence of technological 
progress, there is no effect on banks’ LLP levels (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 and  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0   are insignificant 
across all 4 models).  However, banks that experience technological progress observe two 
different results.  First, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 is negative and significant in both dynamic models.  It is 
therefore apparent that as banks extend their innovative and technological capabilities with 
respect to LLP - through their abilities to determine delinquent and problem loans via new 
innovations - costs decrease through TIP.  These reductions could occur from changes in bank’s 
                                                 
11 Prior literature has estimated both static and dynamic LLP specifications.  For example, Leventis et al., (2012) 
and Curcio & Hasan, (2015) estimate static models; Bouvatier et al., (2014) estimate a dynamic regression and 
Laeven & Majnoni (2003) and Curcio et al., (2017) estimate both.  
Page 17 of 34 
 
use of better computer risk modelling systems and also regulation – an addition to standard 
cost efficiencies (see, Adrian, 2018).  Even though we find evidence of bad management 
(hypothesis 4), banks can potentially reduce the costs associated with their bad management 
practices through the advancing TIP.  That is, improving technology mitigates the impact of 
bad management.12 
When taking into account the effect that technological innovations have had on the asset 
size of banks, we observe that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 is positive and significant.  This result suggests one 
of two things, firstly, as bank’s cost minimizing scale of outputs increases due to innovations 
in technology (for example, capturing more markets with new products or geographical 
expansion thereby increasing lending), banks show an ability to recognize additional risk (see 
Hunter & Timme, 1991, page 339).  They are then able to service the LLP book through the 
introduction of advanced implementation of computer risk management systems on the loan 
portfolio (Hunter & Timme, 1991, call this ‘production innovations’), leading to higher levels 
of LLPs.  Or, secondly, banks which experience changes in their cost minimizing output scale, 
report higher LLPs when at the same time report higher pre-provisioning profits, thus 
strategically amplifying their income smoothing practices.  This could show a link between 
income smoothing and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇.  For example, the smallest asset sized banks experience greater 
scale changes due to technological innovations.  Therefore, if the second hypothesis holds, we 
would expect to find that smaller banks would be more prone to income smoothing.  In 
untabulated results we further test this size hypothesis by re-estimating equation (6) and 
including an interaction term between 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and a size dummy (taking the value of 1 for 
banks that belong to the first 3 quintiles and zero otherwise).  The estimated coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive but insignificant, offering no support in favor of aforementioned 
size hypothesis.  All other estimated coefficients remain qualitatively similar to the reported 
ones in Table 413.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Bad Management 
We find a negative and significant 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 coefficient in all 4 models thereby showing that 
European banks exhibit bad management by skimping on monitoring and thereby reducing 
                                                 
12 We also tested the interaction term between 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 and 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 (those banks which 
experienced improvements in technology).  Both coefficients on these interaction terms were found to be positive 
yet insignificant, while the individual effects of 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 remained the same and significant 
as the current model discussed in this section (results are not presented to save space). 
13 We also used a dummy taking the value of 1 for banks that are smaller than the median of the log of total assets 
and the results still hold.  The interaction term coefficient was positive but still insignificant.  
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future earnings by diverting cash resources (or profits/dividends) to bolster LLPs in the future 
to cover bad decisions in the past (also corroborating Louzis et al. 2012).  That is, generally, 
European bank managers show poor abilities to monitor their loan portfolios and offer loans to 
people who are likely to default in the event of a macroeconomic downturn.  This result ties in 
nicely with the negative and significant relationship between 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 and LLP explained in 
the business cycle hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Income Smoothing 
The income-smoothing hypothesis concerns the relationship between net income (𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) 
and LLP, where we find a significant positive relationship in all estimated regressions (the 
coefficient ranges from 0.478 in the SGMM to 0.231 in the dynamic OLS).  This finding is 
similar to the results across 40 countries by Fonseca and González (2008), European banks by 
Leventis et al. (2011), South East Asian countries by Packer & Zhu (2012), central European 
banks by Skala (2015) and US banks by Balasubramanyan et al. (2016).  Such that, “regardless 
of the commendable or condemnable motives underlying income smoothing” (as shown by a 
positive relationship) “this behavior contributes to financial soundness of banks and reduces 
procyclicality” (page. 150, Bikker & Metzemakers, 2005).  In addition, the drop in the 
estimated coefficient of 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 when moving from the static OLS to the dynamic OLS 
implies that current pre-provisioning profits are correlated with past LLP levels, suggesting a 
potentially endogenous relationship.  When controlling for endogeneity and fixed effects under 
a SGMM, we note that the estimated coefficient doubles in magnitude (equal to 0.4780, Table 
4, column [1]).  This result therefore suggests that ignoring endogeneity and LLP dynamics 
could understate the economic significance of income smoothing.  Therefore, if 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is 
thought to have at least a predetermined effect on LLP then a SGMM approach should be 
estimated. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Capital Management 
With respect to the capital management hypothesis, 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 the sign of the estimated 
coefficient remains unchanged across all models (negative), but its significance changes in the 
static fixed-effects model (significant at the 10%).  However, this significance could be an 
artifact of endogeneity as previous years LLPs are related to levels and hence changes in levels 
of equity.  That is, when taking into account bank specific effects and endogeneity in the 
SGMM, the results indicate that European banks do not boost their Tier 2 capital positions 
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using LLPs, and as such, do not suffer from a “banking system capitalization (problem, which) 
is a barrier to business cycle vulnerability” (Glen & Mondragón-Vélez, 2011, page 158, our 
italics).  A result also found for Indian banks by Ghosh (2007) and European banks by Leventis 
et al. (2012).   
 
Hypothesis 5: Business Cycle 
We find that there is a negative and significant relationship with 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 (GDP growth) 
ranging from −0.0477 in the GMM model, to −0.0292 in the static OLS model.  Therefore, 
European banks did not undertake ‘forward looking’ provisioning, a result corroborated by the 
negative association between credit growth (𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) and LLP.  The implication is that when 
loan portfolios expand during booms, managers decrease reserves, thus not accounting for 
possible future losses.  This result corresponds favorably with the implementation of IAS39 
across Europe.  Implying that objective evidence is required on loan impairments before loan 
loss provisions can be made, hence restricting buffering across the economic cycle and 
exacerbating pro-cyclical LLP.   
In addition, Craig (2005) observes that banks in developed countries (i.e., Australia, Hong 
Kong, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore) generally show a tendency of assessing risk over 
relatively short horizons, leading them to under-estimate risk during boom periods while over-
estimating the risk during economic downturns.  If this was also to be true for European banks 
our results explain the cancelling out of LLP across the business cycle.  However, as Skala 
(2015) notes, our finding “prompts the question of whether the reserves that central European 
banks established during economic booms are sufficient” (page. 35).  Furthermore, this result 
could of course be due in part to overriding macroeconomic conditions in our sample period.  
That is, there was no need to forward provision as banks had different risk management 
behavior characteristics.  To this end, the unemployment rate (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇) is found to be 
insignificant with respect to LLP in all models, see also Bikker & Metzemakers (2005) and 
Olszak et al. (2016).  A possible explanation here, is that the unemployment rate does not act 
as a proxy for loan demand (Beatty & Liao, 2011).  The effect of unemployment is therefore 
minimal and hence we find an insignificant relationship between the unemployment rate, bank 
lending and LLPs.  This relationship between unemployment and LLP is not a forward-looking 
relationship, but a current reactionary co-movement: unemployment increases → loan defaults 
increases →LLP increases.   
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Additional Control Variables and Hypotheses of Interest 
In addition, our findings highlight that 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 (industry non-performing loans) and 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 
(loans to deposits) do not have significant effects on LLPs, and therefore, industry bank 
characteristics and individual bank liquidity constraints do not override risk management 
behavior characteristics.  Interestingly, in all specifications there is a negative and significant 
link between the EU15 status and loan provisions.  That is, ceteris paribus, banks who operate 
in the EU15 countries provision less for bad loans, with respect to their non EU15 counterparts.  
The projected LLP values from the estimated SGMM regression for non EU15 and EU15 
countries are 0.0120*** and 0.0096*** respectively14.   With respect to the additional control 
variables, the dummies 𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 (those banks which are listed on their domestic stock exchanges) 
and 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 (the global financial crisis of 2008) are both insignificant.  Finally, with respect to 
the control variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈, this has a negative effect on LLP in all models, indicating that the 
largest European banks report lower LLPs suggesting that their credit portfolio diversification 
leads them to report lower provisioning levels.  
 
6.2.2. Additional analyses 
Table 5 presents 3 additional SGMM specifications that consider whether our results are 
stable if we exclude 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, analyse post crisis income smoothing and also a non-
linear income smoothing model following Balboa, López-Espinosa, & Rubia, 2013.  In terms 
of our first robustness check, in Model 1, we can see that removing 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 has no 
effect on all the hypotheses 1 to 5 above, everything holds albeit we do note that 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 and 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 now become significant.  Given that 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 could potentially offer an insight, we again 
re-estimate our main SGMM but now Model 2 controls for increased income smoothing during 
the financial crisis (see for example, Curcio, De Simone, & Gallo, 2017).  To investigate for 
increased income smoothing during the crisis, relative to the pre-crisis period, we include an 
interaction term 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 × 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜.  Column [2] in Table 5 reports the estimated coefficients.  
Most of the estimated coefficients remain similar to those reported in Table 4 column 1, 
however the 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈15 dummy turns insignificant.  With respect to 𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 × 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, a one-sided 
t-test does not confirm the hypothesis that banks have smoothed their income via LLPs more 
intensively during or after the crisis.   
 
INSERT TABLE 5 
                                                 
14 95% confidence intervals were estimated using the Delta method, where *** indicates significance at the 1%. 
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The third set of additional analysis considers a potential non-linear effect of income 
smoothing, as incentives to smooth income may be dependent of the relative size of earnings 
(see, Balboa, López-Espinosa, & Rubia, 2013).  In this latter case we generate a dummy 
variable (𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) taking the value of 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 for banks reporting pre-provisioning earnings 
greater than the annual 75th percentile and zero otherwise15.  In Model 3 we find that the 
coefficient of 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is positive and significant at the 1%, indicating that the best performing 
EU banks are more prone to report higher LLPs when earnings are high (Table 5, Column [2]).  
Once again we find that all hypotheses 1 to 5 are unaffected and the remaining coefficients 
maintain their sign and significance in line with Table 4, Column [1].  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
In the banking loan loss provisioning literature there has been widely different reported 
managerial behavior characteristics including; income smoothing, capital management, 
business cycle theory, and bad management hypotheses.  The latter’s effect can originate from 
three sources of inefficiency; cost, technological innovative progress (TIP) and scale based TIP 
(TIPSB).  We present a coherent and fully specified dynamic models that find both bad 
management, TIP and TIPSB are endogenous with respect to LLP risk management behavior.  
That is, previous studies which have only explicitly allocated banks’ income smoothing, capital 
management as the internal change characteristic in provisioning behavior could be mis-
specified through the exclusion of bad management, TIP and TIPSB.   
With respect to our results we find that 38.51% of banks experienced overall TIP but that 
small banks with assets between €280 million and €669 million had a TIP equal to 51.51% and 
medium asset sized banks €670 million to €1,291 million had the largest TIP equal to 65.82%.  
These results show that small and medium asset sized banks are more innovative due to 
technological progress than the largest banks (assets greater than €3,137, TIP equal to 11.61%).  
In addition, when we consider scale biased effects, again the smallest banks show the largest 
                                                 
15 This dummy is a variation used by Bouvatier & Lepetit (2008) as here we are interested in identifying the best 
performing banks in our sample and not simply the ones reporting positive earnings.  We also control for non-
linearity in the earning’s smoothing around the zero threshold by including a dummy variable taking the value of 
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 in the case of positive earnings before provisions and taxes, and zero otherwise.  The results are 
qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Table 9, Column [3] so we do not present them here.  Including both 
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 led to VIF values of 85.68 and 85.24 respectively, thus we chose not include both variables 
together. 
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TIPSB equal to 58.51% whereas the largest banks showed the smallest TIPSB equal to 20.51%.  
That is, ceteris paribus, the larger banks have smaller scale TIPSB efficiencies relative to 
smaller banks and therefore smaller to medium banks see larger cost efficiencies in the 
introduction of new technologies. 
The main findings associated with our new LLP model show that as banks extend their 
innovative and technological capabilities with respect to LLP, costs decrease through TIP.  
These reductions could occur from changes in bank’s use of better risk modelling of their loan 
portfolios and also through new regulations such as Basel capital requirement directives.  In 
addition, even though we find bad management practice, banks can potentially reduce these 
costs through advancing TIP.  That is, the introduction of new technology and the 
improvements that it brings mitigates the impact of bad management and its associated cost 
inefficiencies.   
With respect to the traditional LLP hypotheses, we concur that banks income smooth, 
although profits are correlated with past LLP levels, suggesting a potentially endogenous 
relationship.  European banks do not boost their Tier 2 capital positions using LLPs, and as 
such, do not suffer from a banking system capitalization. Further, these banks did not undertake 
‘forward looking’ provisioning, a result corroborated by the negative association between 
credit growth and LLP.  Finally, we find that the macro environment had little to no effect as 
European banks did not undertake ‘forward looking’ provisioning corresponding favorably 
with the implementation of IAS39 across Europe limiting the pro-cyclical nature of LLPs. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 3,145 0.0101 0.0314 -0.2610 1.2379 
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 3,145 0.0151 0.0172 -0.0531 0.7081 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 3,145 0.0999 0.0718 -0.0029 0.8620 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 3,145 0.0772  0.3085 -0.9879 8.7691 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 3,145 0.0121 0.0330 -0.1481 0.1190 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 3,145 0.0818 0.0326 0.0340 0.2720 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 3,145 0.0624 0.2592 -8.0755 1.0438 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 3,145 -0.0081 0.0172 -0.1766 0 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 3,145 -0.0032 0.0050 -0.0230 0 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 3,145 0.0211 0.0298  0 0.1722 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 3,145 0.0043 0.0053  0 0.0222 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 3,145 6.8930 1.3556 3.7446 10.754 
𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 3,145 0.0480 0.0468 0.0008 0.4487 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 3,145 1.2601 1.6074 0.0202  25 
Summary statistics of the variable included in the estimation of equation (6). 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
Column1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 1             
       
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 0.0595* 1 
            
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 -0.0334* 0.2596* 1 
           
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 -0.0602* 0.1025* 0.0386* 1 
          
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 -0.1069* 0.1081* 0.0195 0.1546* 1 
         
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 0.0948* -0.0423* -0.0137 -0.0474* -0.1459* 1 
        
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 -0.2871* 0.2305* 0.00870 0.0720* 0.2036* -0.1099* 1 
       
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 -0.0887* 0.0206 -0.0296* 0.0162 0.0920* -0.00430 0.0418* 1 
      
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0 0.0657* -0.0233 -0.0829* -0.0907* -0.2349* 0.1067* -0.0671* -0.2515* 1 
     
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 -0.0483* -0.0469* 0.0626* 0.00280 0.0458* -0.0244 0.0365* 0.3403* -0.2638* 1 
    
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0 0.0173 -0.0483* -0.0613* -0.1097* -0.1479* 0.1900* -0.0645* -0.1136* 0.5356* 0.1063* 1 
   
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈 -0.0709* -0.0542* -0.3063* 0.00400 -0.0465* -0.0225 0.0750* -0.00400 0.3150* 0.1089* 0.3376* 1 
  
𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 0.1153* -0.0306* -0.0391* -0.1046* -0.3237* 0.5767* -0.1854* -0.0525* 0.2394* -0.0230 0.3082* -0.0109 1 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜 -0.00220 0.0272 0.1843* -0.0163 -0.0502* 0.0375* -0.0447* -0.2843* 0.0246 -0.00340 0.00820 -0.0512* 0.0303* 1 
Pearson's correlation coefficients 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
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 Table 3. TIP and TIP scale biased results 
Panel A 
TIP 
Frequency 
(significant TIP) 
Average TIP (%) Total 
observations 
Quintile 1 – Smallest 71        11.29 629 
Quintile 2 – Small 324        51.51 629 
Quintile 3 – Medium 414        65.82 629 
Quintile 4 – Large 329        52.31 629 
Quintile 5 – Largest 73        11.61 629 
Overall 1,211       38.51 3,145 
Panel B 
TIPSB 
Frequency 
(significant TIPSB) 
Average TIPSB (%) Total 
observations 
Quintile 1 – Smallest 368        58.51 629 
Quintile 2 – Small 358        56.92 629 
Quintile 3 – Medium 313        49.76 629 
Quintile 4 – Large 218        34.66 629 
Quintile 5 – Largest 129        20.51   629 
Overall           1,386        44.07    3,145 
Frequency: Number of observations with negative technological progress and 
negative scale biased technological progress. The table suggests that 51.51% of small 
sized banks experienced technological progress (Panel A, Quintile 2).  The asset size 
of banks belonging in the five quintiles presented here are discussed in detail in 
Supplementary Appendix B. 
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Table 4. Results of Loan Loss Provisioning Identification 
 Dynamic Models Static Models 
 SGMM Pooled OLS 
with lag 
Pooled OLS VIF Fixed Effects 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝑜𝑜 − 1)  0.2801*** 0.5880***    
 (0.0802) (0.149)    
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  0.4780*** 0.2310**  0.2930** 1.16  0.2880*** 
 (0.155) (0.107) (0.133)  (0.110) 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 -0.0404 -0.0203 -0.0229 1.21 -0.136** 
 (0.0284) (0.0148) (0.0184)  (0.0614) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 -0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0029 1.06 -0.0025 
 (0.0049) (0.0019) (0.0023)  (0.0019) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 -0.0477*** -0.0360*** -0.0292** 1.43 -0.0355*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0146)  (0.0129) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇  0.0544 0.0320  0.0642 1.56 -0.0172 
 (0.0523) (0.0334) (0.0725)  (0.0482) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 -0.0351*** -0.0356*** -0.0444*** 1.15 -0.0434*** 
 (0.0072) (0.0059) (0.0069)  (0.0074) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0   -0.0917** -0.0599* -0.0713 1.32 -0.0106 
 (0.0369) (0.0340) (0.0544)  (0.0393) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0    0.3170** 0.2910***  0.417*** 2.31  0.298 
 (0.144) (0.100) (0.138)  (0.250) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0    0.0344 0.00230  0.0087 1.38 -0.0263 
 (0.0352) (0.0144) (0.0158)  (0.0610) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0    -0.0682 -0.0583 -0.0469 2.15  0.0013 
 (0.117) (0.0809) (0.117)  (0.172) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈    -0.0020*** -0.0009* -0.0022*** 1.42 -0.0033 
 (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003)  (0.0045) 
𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼    0.0016 -0.0138  0.0073 2.03  0.0500** 
 (0.0198) (0.0148) (0.0271)  (0.0197) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜  -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 1.15 -0.0017 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005)  (0.0017) 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙     0.0012 -0.0002  0.0013 1.56  0.0006 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011)  (0.0008) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈15     -0.0024* -0.0025*** -0.0035*** 1.29 -0.0222 
 (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0013)  (0 .0193) 
𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙     0.0002 0.0009 0.0014 1.05  0.0433* 
 (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009)  (0. 0231) 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜  0.0179*** 0.0123**  0.0242***  0.0480 
 (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0072)  (0.0393) 
N 3145 3145 3195  3195 
R2  0.622 0.187  0.218 
Robust Hausman test (p-value)     0.000 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000     
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.957     
Lags 2-4     
IV count (groups) 442 (450)     
Hansen test of overidentification 
(p-value) 
0.516     
Underidentification test for 
differenced equation 
0.0078     
Underidentification test for levels 
equation 
0.0220     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors reported.  For brevity, we report 
only the key diagnostics here.  A detailed description of the additional statistics is presented in Supplementary 
Appendix D.  𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(1) and 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(2) are tests for first and second order serial correlation, under the null hypothesis of 
no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ show the number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  
The Hansen test of overidentification is under the null that all instruments are valid.   
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Table 5. Additional Analyses 
 Model 1 
Without Tech Change 
Model 2 
Post Crisis 
Income smoothing 
Model 3 
Non-Linear 
Income Smoothing 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝑜𝑜 − 1)  0.2550***  0.2890***  0.2670*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0774) (0.0798) 
𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  0.6390***  0.5080***  
 (0.1650) (0.1640)  
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙 × 𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   0.0133  
  (0.147)  
𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    0.3006*** 
   (0.0690) 
𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝜕𝜕 -0.0513 -0.0456 -0.0371 
 (0.0343) (0.0297) (0.0268) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟 -0.0015 -0.0014  0.0015 
 (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 -0.0529*** -0.0415** -0.0390*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0183) (0.0132) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇  0.0500  0.0511  0.0517 
 (0.0559) (0.0536) (0.054) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 -0.0395*** -0.0357*** -0.0344*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0073) (0.0068) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0  -0.0831** -0.0855** 
  (0.0332) (0.0383) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇<0   0.3170**  0.3820** 
  (0.1490) (0.1570) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0   0.0328  0.0427 
  (0.0376) (0.0351) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇>0  -0.0639 -0.156 
  (0.108) (0.123) 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈  0.0005 -0.0021*** -0.0018** 
 (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
𝑇𝑇𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼  0.0087  0.0089  0.0067 
 (0.0211) (0.0238) (0.0196) 
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜  0.0003 -0.0001  0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙  0.0023**  0.0012  0.0005 
 (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0008) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈15 -0.0027** -0.0005 -0.0027** 
 (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0012) 
𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙 -0.0008 -0.0031  0.0007 
 (0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0009) 
𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝜕𝜕𝑜𝑜 -0.0004  0.0168***  0.0212*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0063) (0.0072) 
N 3145 3145 3145 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.919 0.945 0.828 
Lags 2-6 2-4 2-4 
IV count (groups) 390 (450) 442 (450) 443 (450) 
Hansen (p-value) 0.290 0.470 0.511 
Year Effects Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors reported.  𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(1) and 𝐴𝐴𝐺𝐺(2) are 
tests for first and second order serial correlation, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.  The ‘lags’ 
show the number of lags used in the GMM model for bank specific variables.  Our results hold under different lag 
choices.  The Hansen test of overidentification is under the null that all instruments are valid.
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Figure 1. Distributions of Technological Change and Scale Biased Technological Change: pre and post-crisis - Vertical lines represent the median.  
Values less than zero indicate technological progress 
 
Panel A: Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) 
 
Panel B: Technological Innovative Progress Scale Biased (TIPSB) 
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Figure 2. Distributions of banks exhibiting technological progress and scale biased technological progress - Vertical lines represent the median 
 
Panel A: Technological Innovative Progress (TIP) 
 
Panel B. Technological Innovative Progress Scale Biased (TIPSB) 
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